Introduction
The co-occurrence of banking and currency crises has been found to be the norm during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most frequently, banking crises appear to have taken the lead (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) , and these twin crises seem to be far more pervasive in developing countries than developed ones (Glick and Hutchison, 1999) . Banking crises themselves appear to be more likely following financial liberalization Detragiache, 1997 and Eichengreen and Arteta, 2000) . The IMF (1998) has suggested that the greater frequency of banking crises worldwide since the 1980s is "possibly related to the financial sector liberalization that occurred in many countries during this period" (p.115). While these "twin crises" have inspired a number of recent theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on financial crises in developing economies, much less consideration has been given to analytic case studies of actual country experiences with these twin crises and their aftermath. This paper attempts to fill this gap by studying the specific case of Thailand, which was the first domino to fall, triggering the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. The focus of this paper is both on the crisis scenario of 1997-98 as well as the steps taken towards financial sector restructuring and liberalization postcrisis.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. The next section highlights the mechanics of the initial crisis scenario leading to the devaluation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997. Section 3 emphasizes the existence of financial sector fragilities, making the important distinction between illiquidity and insolvency, an issue that has hitherto divided the theoretical literature (see and references cited within). Section 4 outlines the steps taken by Thailand specifically, as well as the other crisis-hit East Asian economies -Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines (henceforth referred to as Asia-5 economies) -towards financial sector
restructuring. An important element of the restructuring and reform efforts in Thailand has been the liberalization of the Thai banking sector and its opening up to foreign competitors 1 . While "internationalization of the banking sector" is at a highly nascent stage, section 5 discusses the impact that the entry of foreign banks has thus far had on the Thai banking system. The final section offers a few concluding remarks on the anticipated benefits as well as risks of permitting foreign bank entry in general, relating it to the Thai context and experience. Three Annexes follows the main text.
The first describes the evolution of the Thai banking sector upto the crisis of 1997-98.
The second summarizes the structure of the Thai financial system. The third reproduces the Bank of Thailand's official guidelines for equity holdings in financial institutions aimed primarily at foreign equity participation.
Crisis-Induced Devaluation
Thailand experienced a bursting of asset price bubble in 1994; the real estate market remained very soft since then, with residential vacancy rates of 25-30 percent and office vacancy rates of 14 percent (Lauridsen, 1998) . However, the stagnant volume of transactions (particularly since much of the office construction was by companies for their own use rather than by professional property developers), along with the lack of market liquidity, resulted in very few new transaction prices being officially registered. The downward correction in real estate prices was not apparent until much later (IMF, 2000) 2 .
Given the large exposures of the domestic financial system to the real estate sector (Table 1) , there was a simultaneous deterioration in the profits and financial conditions of the real estate and finance companies. Capital inflows into Thailand also slowed down sharply between 1996 and early 1997, mainly due to withdrawals from the NRBAs, which were short-term deposits held in domestic banks and other nonbank components, as well as other loans components (Table 2) .
We revisit the issue of financial sector weaknesses in section 3. For now though, it suffices to note that the accumulating losses by the financial institutions inevitably contributed to a stagnation in bank lending in 1996 ).
As would be expected in most developing countries, bank lending has been the dominant form of funding in Thailand . There was, in fact, a four-fold rise (in real terms) in the liquidity provided over the next six months, with BOT credit to financial institutions rising from 2 percent of GDP in 1996 to 15 percent by the end of 1997 (World Bank, 1999) . Consequently, despite the drop in international reserves, the monetary base experienced a sharp rise during that period as the fall in reserves was more than matched by the rise in domestic credit (Figures 1 and 2 ). MacIntyre (1999) succinctly summarizes the course of events in Thailand during this period:
(a) side effect of injecting large scale emergency funding into the…failing finance companies was blowing out the money supply…This served to sharpen the fundamental contradiction in the government's overall macroeconomic position. At the same time as it was pumping money into insolvent finance companies to keep them afloat, the central bank was also spending down reserves to prop up the exchange rate…(T)his was not a sustainable strategy (p.14).
The analytics of the crisis, based on the foregoing discussion, may be succinctly captured below using the following two identities:
3 World Bank data on small and medium sized enterprises in Thailand suggest that bank loans accounted for some 35 percent of total working capital in Thai firms (HallwardDriemeier, et al., 1999) . 4 The Thai authorities established the FIDF in 1985 after the country experienced a deep financial crisis in 1983-84. The FIDF was given the mandate of providing liquidity support to ailing financial institutions. At that time, a support scheme within the FIDF -the "April 4 Lifeboat Scheme" -was created, which offered soft loans to a number of such institutions. Depositors in and a number of creditors of these institutions were generally bailed out. This historical precedence offers a credible basis for agents to have expected an implicit guarantee/strong government backup of the financial system. CAD = -∆R + ∆K (1)
where: CAD is the current account deficit; ∆R is the change in reserves; ∆K represents capital flows; ∆H is the change in the monetary base; and ∆NDA is the change in net domestic assets. Eq. (1) is simply the balance of payments accounting identity stating that a current account deficit must be financed through drawing down international reserve holdings or through capital inflows. Eq. (2) states that changes in the monetary base must be an outcome of changes in international reserves and net domestic assets. Substituting eq. (1) into (2) we get:
With ∆K (∆R) < 0 and ∆H = 0 (given the costs of an interest rate hike), it follows that ∆NDA > 0. If capital outflows and reserve losses are sustained, the result is inevitably that the currency will be expected to depreciate, leading to an increase in domestic interest rates. As reserves fall to some minimum level, the expected currency devaluation will become a reality. In Thailand, this happened on July 2 nd 1997 ( Figure 3 ).
Financial Sector Fragilities, Capital Outflows and Consequences
As the preceding section has highlighted, weaknesses in the financial system played a key role in the crisis-induced devaluation in Thailand. More specifically, the solvency problems in a number of finance companies and weaker banks led to the currency crisis (via monetary disequilibrium due to an FIDF-induced bail out). This distinction between insolvency initially of a group of finance companies predevaluation followed by a systemic liquidity crisis (leading to a vicious spiral culminating with financial and economic collapse) is confirmed by the time line of the problems in Thai finance companies and commercial banks; we briefly highlight it below 5 .
Prior to the IMF Stand-by arrangement in August 1997, the BOT recognized the necessity to segregate solvent/viable financial institutions from non-viable ones.
Thus, the BOT and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) announced that 10 (unnamed finance companies) would need to raise capital, failing which the FIDF would effectively take control of the institutions in March 1997. Public confidence in finance companies eroded between March and June 1997, as there were deposit withdrawals by the public (but not an outright panic of the entire financial system).
The FIDF provided liquidity support to 66 (of a total of 91) finance companies. The BOT suspended 16 finance companies in June (7 of which were from the March list).
Notably, 43 percent of loans of these suspended companies were to the real estate sector (IMF, 2000) .
With the intensifying slowdown in economic activity and growing loss of confidence in the financial system, blanket guarantees were provided to banks and the remaining finance companies by the FIDF in order to maintain public confidence in the financial system (i.e. "containment" policy). The MOF and BOT also issued a joint statement detailing measures to strengthen confidence government and announced that no more finance companies would be suspended beyond the 16.
Such blanket guarantees obviously entail very large sovereign contingent liabilities.
All these events occurred prior to the devaluation, at a time when external capital was still flowing into the domestic financial system. 5 Of course, the distinction between solvency and liquidity is very fine. As noted by Lindgren et al. (1999) exodus of these banking sector flows. Capital outflows from NRBAs were $3.5 billion in the first half of 1997, over $2 billion in the second half of the year, and slowed to about $2.7 billion for the 1998 as a whole. This led to a state of national illiquidity.
The solvency crisis of selected institutions followed by the systemic liquidity crisis and resulting virtual collapse of the domestic financial system, inevitably led to a large-scale domestic "credit rationing" in Thailand. We do not enter here into the controversial debate of defining what is meant by a "credit crunch" and how it is most appropriately measured, only recognizing that credit growth reflects both the demand for and supply of credit . There was, not surprisingly, a severe curtailment in aggregate demand, GDP declining by 10 per cent in 1998 after having fallen nearly 2 per cent in 1997 (Table 3) .
Financial Sector Restructuring
Insofar as financial sector fragilities were the proximate causes of the Thai crisis and collapse, financial sector restructuring has been an essential element in structural adjustment programs in the East Asian economies. At the risk of generalizing, governments in the crisis-hit regional economies have attempted to restructure their financial systems by -closing down commercial banks and finance companies;
-merging some existing institutions and nationalizing others;
-injecting public funds to recapitalized viable banks;
-putting in place systematic asset resolution strategies; and -permitting foreign investment into the financial sector (discussed in the next section). Aghion et al. (2000) show how devaluation leads to an appreciation in the local currency value of corporate debt. This curtails absorption and output, lowering money demand, consequently causing the currency to depreciate. In a bank-based economy with large-scale unhedged foreign debt, forward-looking agents will expect this outcome, leading to a vicious spiral of devaluation, insolvency and bearish expectations.
Restructuring Authority (FRA) in October 1997 to review rehabilitation plans of the 58 suspended finance companies and to oversee their liquidation, (all but two were shut down.) An AMC was also set up centrally but only as a buyer/bidder of last resort for the lowest quality assets in order to prevent a fire sale of assets of the 56 closed finance companies (which in turn could undermine the intrinsic collateral values of the financial system in general).
As capital outflows accelerated, some weaker banks were intervened in Table 5 shows that all the East Asian economies have made some headway in reducing nonperforming loans (NPLs). NPL ratios for commercial banks in Korea and Malaysia have fallen to less than 10 percent, due in part to the rapid economic recovery in 1999-2000 (i.e. banks have to some extent grown out of their problems).
In contrast, NPLs have remained relatively high in Thailand (about 30 percent), possibly reflecting the Thai government's preference for a more market-oriented approach to financial restructuring. However, according to some estimates between a one fifth and a third of the NPLs in Thailand are "strategic" in the sense that borrowers, while able to repay, are unwilling to do so since legal recourse by creditors tends to be rather ineffective (World Bank, 2000) . Evidence of the magnitude of the problems in the financial sector is proxied by the fiscal costs of restructuring (Table 6 ). It is important to keep in mind the caveat that such estimations of fiscal costs are undoubtedly fraught with difficulties as they are heavily dependent on a number of assumptions. This being said, it is instructive to note that the bailout and restructuring costs in Thailand are conservatively estimated at around 30 percent of GDP. This figure is much lower than the estimated costs in Indonesia (58 percent of GDP), but much higher than those in South Korea and Malaysia (16 and 10 percent respectively) (ADB, 2000).
Foreign Bank Entry to the Thai Banking Sector
As a part of the financial sector restructuring process, the Thai authorities permitted foreign banks that already have a full branch or a Bangkok International
Banking Facility (BIBF) to acquire a majority stake in Thai commercial banks (see (Table 7) .
While the four foreign banks bought stakes in the medium-to small-sized banks, they remain rather minor participants in the Thai banking scene. Specifically, the four Thai banks with foreign major shareholders hold only 7.5 per cent of the banking system's total capital or assets as of April 2001. Their market shares in terms of loans and deposits are also rather low (Tables 8 and 9 ), as they are in terms of actual number of domestic branches. The four foreign banks have 287 branches or just 8 per cent of total bank branches in Thailand. Most of these branches are concentrated in Bangkok area, in contrast to the five largest Thai banks which have built strong regional presence (Table 10 ).
9 Any subsequent capital injections into banks that have more than 49 foreign equity conducted after the 10 year period require the participation of Thai investors.
Impact of Foreign Bank Entry in Thailand
What is the impact of foreign bank entry? There is a growing body of literature which suggests that the entry into the domestic market by foreign banks can be expected to gradually drive down the cost structure of the domestic banking sector, as state of the art technology and best practices are introduced (Levine, 1996) . For instance, using bank level data for 80 countries over the period 1988 -95, Claessens et al. (2001 found that the greater was the degree of foreign bank penetration, the lower was domestic bank profitability and overall expenses. Similarly, using aggregate accounting data for 14 developed countries for 1976, Terrell (1986) found that domestic banks in countries that allowed the entry of foreign banks had lower profits and greater efficiency 10 .
What evidence can we bring to bear on the effects of foreign bank entry in
Thailand? This is, in some senses, a difficult and possibly premature question to answer since bank internationalization in Thailand is at an early stage and the presumed benefits may take time to materialize. While we are unable to undertake a systematic evaluation of cost structures and efficiency levels of the Thai banking system pre and post internationalization, it would be useful to consider available evidence based on a casual examination of recent trends and ongoings in the Thai banking system 11 .
To begin with, Table 11 shows that after managing costs carefully and controlling operating expenses efficiently, total expenses and cost to income ratios of the Thai banking sector declined markedly in 2000. Bottom-line profits began to be shown, as indicated by net profit to total income. Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) remained negative but lower than those in 1999.
10 Also see the useful country case study by Dobson and Jacquet (1999) . 
Concluding Remarks
There is revealing albeit unsystematic and casual evidence of the benefits of foreign bank entry in Thailand by way of reductions in cost structures, improvements in operational efficiency, introduction and application of new technologies, banking products, marketing skills and management and corporate governance structures.
These early results do indicate that foreign bank entry in Thailand has improved the functioning of the national banking system and provided some positive welfare gains for bank customers. Foreign bank entry does bring with it added potential advantages over time that may be less obvious.
First, entry of foreign banks ought to reduce the extent of "non-commercial" or "connected" lending, as these banks are not as politically connected and less likely to "capture" regulatory authorities (Kroszner, 1998) . Second, since foreign banks' portfolios are far less concentrated in any single country, particularly in the emerging host ones, they should be much less susceptible to country-specific crises. Third, a banking system with an internationally diversified asset base may be more likely to be stable and less prone to bank runs and outright crises since the domestic branches of foreign banks are able to obtain financing from the foreign head office, which could act as a private lender of last resort
12
. Fourth, bank internationalization may create domestic pressures for local banking authorities in the host countries to enhance and eventually harmonize regulatory and supervisory procedures and standards to international best practice levels Glaessner, 1998 and Levine, 1996) . There is much to be said for a gradual as opposed to "cold turkey" or "big bang" approach to financial internationalization. A graduated move towards introducing foreign competition ought to avoid any major disruptions to the domestic financial system by enticing domestic banks to opt for increasingly risky investments.
If such "gambling for redemption" occurs, an increase in bad loans due to risky investments will partially offset the efficiency gains associated with greater 12 On the other hand, this could also be a source of contagious transmission of crises. For instance, in response to a crisis in one country, multinational banks might attempt to liquidate positions in other regional economies in which they have exposures in an anticipation of increased redemptions; the need to cover losses in other crisis-hit markets ("cash-in" effects), and in order to reduce portfolio risks and improve the liquidity position ("flight to safety" effects. This is broadly referred to as the "credit crunch" or "liquidity" channel, as it entails a general reduction in the availability of funds.
international competition (Berger and De Young, 1997) . There are other reasons to favor a gradual internationalization of the banking system as opposed to a "cold turkey" or "big bang" approach suggested by some observers. For instance, time is also needed for domestic bank consolidation if local banks are to be able to compete effectively against the multinational foreign banks which have much larger and diversified capital bases. Consistent with this, on the basis of a panel study of 53
countries for the period 1980-95, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) have stressed that financial liberalization in general must be undertaken "cautiously" and only when the institutional environment is strong, there exists effective and welldeveloped prudential regulations and supervision, and the overall macroeconomic environment is stable
13
. Indeed, this conclusion is particularly significant and should be self-evident when one recalls that Thailand's hasty and ill-sequenced approach to capital account liberalization in the early 1990s led to the accumulation of large-scale unhedged foreign debt and "excessive" risk-taking by financial institutions and the eventual currency and economic collapse ).
As with any other structural reforms and liberalization program, bank internationalization can be expected to lead to temporary labor market disruptions, particularly in sheltered industries which are invariably over-staffed. Indeed, Crispin . Inevitably, the ongoing high retrenchments in the banking sector have become a social issue. Public criticism over job insecurity in foreign-owned banks has been on the rise.
13 Macroeconomic instability and ill-timed or ill-sequenced banking sector liberalization may be among the reasons why some empirical studies have found that foreign bank entry has either had no discernible impact on overall efficiency of the national banking system or even led to an observable decline (for instance, see Denizer, et al., 2000) .
These political economy compulsions and past experiences appear to have further swayed the Thai authorities towards undertaking a gradual move towards the internationalization of the financial sector. However, the danger of such an approach to internationalization is that it may eventually "run out of steam", as opponents of the program will have an opportunity to block it. Indeed, sales of domestic Thai banks to foreign investors, particularly those that are nationalized, appear to have been put on hold, at least temporarily. The FIDF rejected two bids for a majority stake in Siam City Bank (SCIB), having failed to agree on asset pricing. Negotiations to sell Bangkok Metropolitan Bank (BMB) to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) were formally cancelled due to "irreconcilable differences" on how taxes would be treated for restructured loans. Efforts to sell both SCIB and BMB to foreign investors were also formally cancelled in December 2000
14
. Dobson and Jacquet (1999) have emphasized the importance of making "credible and binding commitments to pursue full reform…(as)..a necessary complement to any gradual sequence, as it helps contain hostile domestic interests."
Under the terms of Thailand's IMF structural agreement and the WTO financial services offer, the absolute amount of investments by foreign financial institutions that enter the Thai market until 2007 will be permanently grand fathered. This ought to ensure there is at least partial commitment by the Thai authorities towards opening up the banking sector over time.
14 The SCIB and BMB are medium-sized banks, ranked between seventh and ninth in terms of total capitals, total assets, loans, deposits, and number of domestic branches. Their branches are relatively concentrated in non-Bangkok areas. If these two banks are sold to foreign investors, the total number of foreign-majority-ownership banks will be 6, out of the current 13 commercial banks. In aggregate, their market shares will be around 16 per cent and in the 7th-to-13th rank. Almost 60 per cent of their customer base will be scattered outside of the Bangkok area. were encouraged by the fact that loans through the BIBF were exempt from the withholding tax (of 10 percent). The BIBF institutions also benefited from reduced corporate income tax rates (10 percent as opposed to 30 percent) and exemptions from stamp duties, the permanent establishment tax, and a number of sales taxes (BOT, 1996 (BOT, , 1999 . The establishment of these international facilities provided the impetus for large-scale capital inflow boom into Thailand and the subsequent bust . 
Annex 3: Guidelines for Equity Holdings in Financial Institutions
The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Thailand have recently announced the measure to restore confidence in the financial sector by requiring commercial banks and finance companies currently in operation to increase their capital as a cushion against any potential loss from asset deterioration. All financial institutions are encouraged to take early action so as to prevent problem in the future. .
To facilitate and expedite financial institutions' capital increase, the Bank of Thailand, with the approval of the Minister of Finance, has set the following guidelines for the financial institution's capital increase:
1. Guideline for foreign equity participation in Thai financial institutions 1.1 Foreign investors that have sound financial status and high potential to help increase the efficiency in the management of the financial institution shall be allowed to hold more than 49% of the share in the 15 commercial banks, 33 finance companies, and 12 credit foncier companies for a period of 10 years. After 10 years, foreign investors will not be forced to sell their shares but may not purchase any additional shares, unless the amount of foreign shareholdings is less than 49% of total shares. Additional shares may be acquired to bring foreign shareholdings to 49% of total shares.
For the holding of shares of the 58 suspended finance companies, the Financial Sector Restructuring Agency (FRA) shall follow the guideline of the Committee to Supervise the Merger and Acquisition of Financial Institutions announced on 13 October 1997. The guideline allows unlimited amount of shareholding by foreign shareholders up to period of 10 years. After 10 years, foreign investors may not purchase any more shares unless the amount held is less than 49% of total shares in which case additional shares maybe acquired until the 49% mark is reached.
1.2 The guideline shall be the same for foreign investors that are banks. The foreign bank that already has a full branch or a Bangkok International Banking Facility will be allowed to continue their existing operation. However, the authorities reserve the right not to allow a foreign bank that has more than 49% stake in a Thai bank to have an additional full branch in Thailand.
Thai financial institutions' holdings of shares in other financial institutions
The authorities have the intention to apply the same guideline for Thai commercial banks and finance companies with sound financial status that wish to hold shares in other banks and finance companies. Nonetheless, there are legal limitations which prohibit a domestically incorporated commercial bank from holding other bank's shares unless approved by the Finance Minister on a case-by-case basis, and with a specified timeframe. Finance companies are also subject to the same legal constraints.
Therefore, the guideline regarding the shareholding in other financial institutions by domestically incorporated banks and finance companies will be as follows:
The authorities will allow domestically incorporated banks and finance companies with sound financial status to have more than 49% stake in other financial institutions for a period of 10 years. After 10 years if the banks or finance companies request to maintain their ownership, the extension will be approved on the ten-year basis. During the extension period, banks and finance companies will not be forced to sell their shares. Additional shares maybe acquired to bring their shareholdings to 49% of total shares.
Common directors
Thai commercial banks and finance companies that are allowed to hold shares in other financial institutions according to 2 above may have the same directors as the financial institutions in which they hold shares for no more than 3 years. Further extension may be allowed if necessary.
The Bank of Thailand believes that the above guidelines will assist in the capital increase of financial institutions and will provide equal treatment between Thai and foreign investors.
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